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fortress Zeelandia, near present-day 
tainan. Koxinga succeeded in taking 
the fortress and driving the remain-
ing dutch back to batavia (currently 
Jakarta) over the course of a bit-
terly contested nine-month siege.
andrade compares Chinese seventeenth- 
century military capabilities with those 
of the dutch, especially on four levels. 
His conclusions are, first, that the 
technology in guns was about equal but 
that second, the military discipline of 
the Chinese was better than that of the 
dutch, whose discipline was vaunted 
in europe at the time. third, as for 
ships, the ability of the dutch ships to 
sail to windward gave them an edge 
over Chinese. fourth, although the 
Chinese outnumbered the dutch by a 
large margin, the renaissance fortress 
configuration, with corner battle-
ments, allowed the dutch to hold out 
for many months before surrendering. 
that was long enough for Koxinga to 
study and absorb the technology of 
the renaissance fort and incorporate it 
into his own counterstrategy. each side 
had elements of relative strength, and 
the elements were not static in terms 
of relative advantage. thus, andrade 
proposes, during the seventeenth 
century China was fairly similar to 
europe in terms of military capabilities.
Koxinga and his heirs controlled taiwan 
until 1683, when they were defeated by 
a former Zheng family commander, shi 
lang, who had defected to support the 
Qing emperor. andrade makes the in-
teresting observation that the Qing dy-
nasty, following the taiwan campaigns 
of the late 1600s, was an era of 160 
years of peace in China, requiring little 
in the way of military advancement. 
Meanwhile, europe was embroiled in 
nearly constant warfare, improving its 
military capabilities decade by de-
cade. thus the Chinese were to be at 
a distinct military disadvantage when 
the opium Wars began in 1839, and 
the century of humiliation for China 
was by that time a fait accompli with 
respect to relative military advantage.
the book includes a fine set of maps 
and figures, as well as a dust jacket 
with an evocative seventeenth-century 
painting by andries beckman of the 
dutch fort at batavia. the dutch 
governor of taiwan, frederick Coyet, 
was executed symbolically in front 
of this fort for losing the profit-
able colony of taiwan to Koxinga. 
graNt f. rHode
Fairbank center for chinese Studies
Harvard University
lo Jung-pang, edited by bruce elleman. china as 
a Sea Power: a Preliminary Survey of the Mari-
time expansion and naval exploits of the chinese 
People during the Southern Song and Yuan Peri-
ods. singapore: National Univ. of singapore Press, 
2012. 378pp. $35
lo Jung-pang (1912–81), the scion of 
a distinguished Chinese family, was 
a great historian, old enough to have 
received a traditional Chinese educa-
tion when young and young enough 
to have mastered the Western way as 
a student abroad. like many of his 
cohorts, he chose exile, becoming one 
of those who for decades kept the study 
of China alive outside the country until 
the post-Mao liberalization of the 1980s 
allowed its resumption at home. lo, 
a long-serving professor and histo-
rian in the United states, focused on 
China’s great middle era and launched 
the field of China’s maritime history. 
bruce elleman’s unearthing and editing 
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of this previously unavailable 1950s 
manuscript, properly seeing contem-
porary United states–China strategic 
relations as his backdrop, has made 
lo’s encyclopedic knowledge available 
to us. However, lo’s book is instruc-
tive beyond that; china as a Sea Power 
is a magisterial contribution to the 
study of world maritime history and 
should be known everywhere by those 
who are interested in that subject.
lo was determined to illuminate China’s 
maritime history to edify his country-
men, who had seen the consequences 
of a lack of naval power. In the first 
decades of lo’s life, foreign navies domi-
nated China’s coastal ports and also 
had wide-ranging rights in other ports 
hundreds of miles up the great rivers. It 
was as if foreign navies could, by right, 
sail at will up the Mississippi from New 
orleans to Minneapolis. the Chinese 
had become accustomed to the seeming 
inevitability of such circumstances and 
knew of the failures to revive Chinese 
naval power at the end of the nineteenth 
century and of Japan’s easy closure of 
China’s ports between 1937 and 1945. It 
was for them that lo wanted to present 
a grand history of Chinese power on 
the sea, and not only naval power but 
seaborne commercial power and the 
urbanization, wealth, and sophistication 
that it had created in great ages past. 
China’s remarkable efflorescence that 
we see today derives from such visions. 
of this book’s many compelling ac-
counts, perhaps the richest is lo’s 
description of the naval campaigns of 
the Mongols, who, as the yuan dynasty, 
ruled China between 1271 and 1368. 
the Mongols, who had no experi-
ence fighting at sea, quickly adapted 
and soon organized armadas built and 
manned by their new Chinese subjects. 
they launched invasions northward 
into the east China sea and southward 
into the south China sea. today’s 
increasingly visible and vocal Chinese 
admirals seem eager to draw inspira-
tion from these huge undertakings, but 
for all the immense capabilities they 
demonstrated, Kublai Khan’s two inva-
sions of Japan and his three invasions 
of vietnam in the thirteenth century 
all ended in disaster. eight centuries 
later, in his November 2012 valedictory 
address, Hu Jintao, China’s outgoing 
president and the Communist Party’s 
general secretary, urged his successors 
“to build China into a maritime power.” 
In this they would be well advised to 
read lo Jung-pang’s account of China’s 
past glories as a sea power, not only as 
inspiration but also as a cautionary tale.
CHarles HorNer 
Senior Fellow, Hudson institute, and author of 
rising China and Its Postmodern fate
tucker, Nancy bernkopf. The china Threat: 
Memories, Myths, and realities in the 1950s. New 
york: Columbia Univ. Press, 2012. 312pp. $39.50
President dwight d. eisenhower is 
remembered in history as a dedicated 
Cold Warrior whose staunch anticom-
munism included commitment to the 
containment and rollback of com-
munism in asia. In The china Threat 
Nancy bernkopf tucker challenges 
this narrative, suggesting that eisen-
hower and secretary of state John foster 
dulles possessed a more nuanced view 
of China than is generally supposed. 
tucker is an established and respected 
historian of U.s. policy toward China 
whose earlier works include a study 
of U.s.-Chinese relations during the 
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